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CONSCIOUSNESS AND AI: REFORMULATING THE 
ISSUE 
 
Patrick Holzman 
 
Abstract    In this paper, I explore the ―issue‖ of consciousness in 
artificial intelligences, the problem of whether they can be 
conscious, specifically going for simply asking what consciousness 
involves, instead of more technical aspects of the field. I use 
Robert Kirk's concepts of the "Basic Package" as well as "Direct 
Activity" to outline what being conscious involves, and attempt to 
apply it to artificially designed and constructed beings. I assume 
that artificial conscious intelligences will be constructed, 
eventually; my goal is to suggest a specific and more useful way of 
thinking about consciousness, which will hopefully accelerate the 
inevitable. 
 
The science of artificial intelligence deals with attempts to 
make programs or machines that can function in an intelligent way. 
What "intelligent" means is dependent on our own judgment and 
defined for the most part in terms of our own actions. Humans (and 
animals) act "intelligently," and so when we want to create an 
artificial intelligence, what we want is something that acts like us, 
that at least appears to make complex judgments and choices about 
its environment. Note that I have deliberately phrased this 
description of AI with phrases like "acts intelligently," or "appears 
to make judgments," or "functions in a certain way." That is, I've 
put these goals in terms of what the intelligences do, what their 
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behavior is, without any mention of their internal structure, and in 
doing so l leave open the question of consciousness and the 
"mind."  
From my fairly limited understanding of the perspective of 
those working with AI, this is entirely reasonable. The goal of 
engineers working in AI is to create something that acts 
intelligently. The challenge is the execution, the structure of the 
program, but the goal itself is purely based on behavior. I might 
even be so bold as to say that many researchers in AI assume that 
"consciousness," and rational judgment, whatever these involve, 
will come out in the wash, around when we get things that can 
truly act like a person. However, I feel that consciousness should 
be a goal in itself,
1
 and the path to consciousness will involve the 
amplification of some already existing "bare awareness" or 
"internal life" found in all systems. I will first talk a bit about the 
field of artificial intelligence, then consciousness in general (that 
is, attempt to define what I'm talking about in the first place), then 
introduce Robert Kirk's idea of the "Basic Package" or the 
"decider," and then finally his concept of "direct activity" and the 
"Basic Package Plus" to work out how one could judge whether a 
thing has consciousness or not. Using these, Kirk constructs a 
model of consciousness, or at least the salient aspects of 
consciousness in terms of testing for it. I agree with his views, and 
ultimately I will conclude that the phenomenal aspect of 
consciousness is not as important as the ability to make judgments 
and to actually understand the world. 
                                                 
1
 More precisely, I feel that creating an AI that would qualify as one of Kirk‘s 
―deciders‖ is worthwhile as a goal; I think it will be clear why after I describe 
Kirk‘s concepts.  
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The claim "AI researchers don't care about consciousness" 
is something of a straw man, but I want to dispel even the smallest 
hint of behaviorism. To be blunt, logical behaviorism, the opinion 
that all there is to having a mind is acting in a certain way, seems 
absolutely incomprehensible. In this sort of behaviorism, the 
statement "he believes that it will rain" is identical with the 
statement "he carries an umbrella and otherwise acts in certain 
ways." But this is quite false. Consider a hypothetical table-based 
system, wherein all conceivable inputs are associated with various 
outputs: input A at state J causes output X and state K, input B at 
state M causes output Y and state N, all down a table. Given a long 
enough table, and a fast enough method to access it, you could 
have an AI that perfectly replicated a human.
2
 However, it seems 
rather obvious that this would not possess a rational mind, would 
not analyze the world or make judgments, but instead function 
purely through reaction. 
A behaviorist would say that this is an unfair criticism; 
such a thing would be impossible to execute. If we were to create a 
being that acted like a human, and fully like a human, able to react 
to an indefinite variety of situations, and its hardware was limited 
to something the size of a human head, then it seems reasonable to 
assume that such a thing would likely be acting in a complex, rich 
way, actually having an internal functioning of similar convolution 
to ours, if likely with a different sort of structure. Phrased this way, 
behaviorism is much more about practical judgments about the 
nature of things we could encounter or build. This still misses the 
                                                 
2
 I do mean, though, an extremely long table, with a great many states and inputs. 
Essentially the false human‘s entire life story would count as a single state.  
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point behind asking whether something really possesses a mind or 
is conscious—unless there is something beyond the material, 
possession of a mind must line up with some physical state of 
things. Furthermore, advances in technology may allow us to make 
astonishingly complex AIs that, nonetheless, will have no true 
mind. 
The goal at the moment is to make programs that solve 
problems humans are still not very good at, such as traffic control 
or chess. Generally this is done by formalizing the situation 
mathematically, then writing a program to manipulate this 
formalization and find what best fits a certain criteria. It is not that 
"is efficient" is the criterion, but rather that there is some variable 
in the formalization that the program attempts to minimize or 
maximize. Once the formalization is "translated" back into our 
own understanding of the problem, this variable is identified with 
efficiency, but a significant part of the work when making the 
artificial intelligence is this formalization, in determining how best 
to abstractly represent the problem. Even when researchers attempt 
to create AIs that learn through something like a "neural net," they 
must first create a domain within which the AI will function; the 
problem has changed from solving a certain problem in a certain 
language, to working out the language and what problem is 
involved while still using a certain other language.  
Here I want to begin to use words like "syntax" and 
"semantics," but I think doing so would be dangerous—such words 
have been used many times before and have vague definitions.
3
 It 
                                                 
3
 I also suspect the way I use these words, or at least what I consider important 
about them, is different from many others‘. 
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might be best to carefully lay out what I'm talking about. When I 
refer to consciousness, I am to a certain extent going by Nagel's 
idea of having a "what it's like.‖4 My eventual conclusion is, 
however, that the phenomenal aspect of consciousness, this feel, is 
not what is valuable. Rather, the value comes in the ability to make 
judgments about the world; whether our perception is immediate or 
has no phenomenological aspect is irrelevant. The distinction I‘m 
trying to focus on is one between "consciousness" and 
"awareness," between "perception" and "sensation." Awareness, 
sensation, is simply having a first-person perspective from which 
certain things are experienced, while consciousness, perception, is 
to have some context, some interpretation of that sensation. 
Perception is sensation with internal context; consciousness is 
awareness with actual meaningful content. This is a very fuzzy 
distinction, one that will be better distinguished when I get to 
Kirk's deciders and the basic package. One possible way to think 
of it is by the concept of "raw feels," which here would just be 
sensation. The "raw feels," the sensations, are the raw bits of 
context-less information that comes into a system, which for some 
things is then interpreted and becomes perception, becomes 
conscious. For those things which are not conscious, sensation 
cause some reflexes to fire, and in this manner they are yet aware. 
 
Terms and Assumptions 
In earlier versions of this paper I freely used 
"consciousness" when what I meant was "a mind," in this sense of 
                                                 
4
 Nagel, Thomas. 1974. "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" The Philosophical 
Review. 83 (4): 435-450. 
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"rational and analyzing" that I've been stressing. To jump ahead, 
the distinction between an unconscious and a conscious mind is, in 
Kirk's terms, the addition of "direct activity," the fact that for a 
conscious mind perception is irresistible and happens 
automatically. Perception of the world directly affects the mind, 
changing how that being will achieve its goals or what its goals 
are, with no need to reflect on its body of knowledge. This ―direct 
activity‖ is what is entailed by consciousness, the ―what it‘s like.‖ 
The actual rationality should not be properly referred to as 
―consciousness,‖ except in that explicit sense of rationality. That 
is, we are not discussing ―conscious vs. unconscious,‖ but rather 
―conscious vs. reflexive‖ or something along those lines.  
By "system" I really do mean any sort of system. For the 
most part I'm talking about complex life-forms, but computer 
programs, robots, even things like toasters or thermostats count as 
a "system." The "basic package" and "deciders" will be detailed in 
more depth later, but essentially a "decider" is something that 
analyzes information about its environment, forms goals, and then 
executes those goals. I will say that systems that are deciders have 
"minds," and "mind" here means "rational, complex mind." 
"Consciousness" refers to minds or deciders that have direct 
activity, Kirk's "basic package plus." Unfortunately, I do not have 
a simple term for systems that are not deciders that still have direct 
activity. I think they could be called "non-rational sensing 
systems."  
I will go ahead and assume there is nothing beyond our 
physical bodies at work when we speak of the mind. Our brains do 
things, and this activity, from a different perspective, is called 
―mind.‖ Brain activity does not ―produce‖ minds over and above 
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the brain, they is not ―caused‖ by that activity. Rather, the activity 
in the brain somehow is the activity in the mind. You could not 
have a human brain functioning the way it does without also 
having a mind. This is not a contingent fact, but rather a fact about 
the sort of activity that occurs in the brain, that it is also conscious 
mental activity, when viewed from the inside. I take this as a 
matter of faith, and feel no need to defend this. It seems for the 
most part obvious, and, honestly, not that interesting.  
I will also assume that consciousness is an interesting and 
worthy topic of discussion. There is something that it is to be 
conscious; you and I can feel it just by thinking. This needs to be 
acknowledged, and explored. Finally, I will also assume that the 
mind could best be described as "activity within the brain when 
viewed from a different perspective." Searle gives this formulation: 
―Mental phenomena are caused by neurophysiological processes in 
the brain and are themselves features of the brain.‖5 I would agree, 
with a caveat about the exact use of language. I want to stress that 
the mind is not ―caused‖ by the brain, but is the brain; I think I 
mean the same as Searle, but that I am insisting on a certain 
language. Searle talks about the mind being an emergent property 
of the brain, in the same way that wetness is an emergent property 
of H2O. Now, is wetness ―caused‖ by the H2O? Not exactly, not in 
the same sense that a rock causes a window to shatter. H2O does 
not ―produce‖ wetness, but rather it is wet, in sufficient quantities. 
―Produce‖ and ―cause‖ evoke to me feelings of ―extrude‖ and 
―impart,‖ not ―possess.‖ However, if we are to say that the brain 
―causes‖ the mind in the same way that H2O ―causes‖ wetness, 
                                                 
5
 John R. Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind (Cambridge: MIT, 1992, 1.  
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then it‘s quite fine. Indeed, the other half of his formulation is that 
mental phenomena ―are themselves features of the brain.‖ 
Although I've focused on just this example, I think similar sorts of 
situations abound and are what actually make up many of the 
apparent differences among various theories.  
What is tenuous, and interesting, is the use of ―from a 
different perspective,‖ when saying what the mind is. An objection 
can be raised that this physicalist explanation does not account for 
all aspects of the mental, that there is an ―explanatory gap.‖ 
Nagel‘s Bat6 and Jackson‘s Mary7 are paradigmatic thought 
experiments/arguments for this ―internal perspective.‖ The 
explanatory gap implies that knowledge of the physical world will 
not give you the knowledge of ―what it‘s like.‖ However, for now I 
am not focused so much on what it is like to be something, but 
rather whether there is a ―what it‘s like‖ for any specific thing. I 
suspect there is a ―what it‘s like‖ to be a cat, and that there is not a 
―what it‘s like‖ to be a rock, and furthermore that we can tell this 
empirically, and where the line is, just from physical facts. Even if 
physical facts can‘t tell what it is like, they can still tell whether 
there is a ―what it‘s like.‖ It is interesting to pursue whether we can 
tell ―what it‘s like‖ to be something, and I will do so, somewhat, 
but the difficulties we have in doing so do not change our 
knowledge that there is a ―what it‘s like‖ to be something. 
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 Thomas Nagel, “What is it like to be a bat?” (Philosophical Review, 1974).   
7
 Frank Jackson, “What Mary didn’t know” (Journal of Philosophy, 1986). I’m 
going to assume some familiarity with both of these.  
 125 
 
Brain/Mind Identity 
Before I get much farther, it may be valuable for me to 
clarify my position, especially towards mind/brain identity. The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy states ―The identity theory of 
mind holds that states and processes of the mind are identical to 
states and processes of the brain. [. . .] Consider an experience of 
pain, or of seeing something, or of having a mental image. The 
identity theory of mind is to the effect that these experiences just 
are brain processes, not merely correlated with brain processes.‖8 
On my view, there are two ways you can interpret this in terms of 
AIs possessing minds. One way is to say that, obviously, an AI 
cannot have a mind, as minds are identical to brains and thus non-
brain possessing AIs will not possess minds. The other way, my 
way, is to say that AIs can quite easily possess minds, just minds 
that are very unlike our own, as their brains are unlike our own, in 
structure. What is the mind in the brain is the brain‘s structure—
the mind is not a non-physical object whose parts can be identified 
with the parts of the physical object of the brain, but rather the 
organizational relations of the mind are identified with the 
relations in the brain. The mind is already nothing more than a set 
of relations; what the mind is identical with in the brain is those 
relations of the parts of the brain.  
The sort of identity theory I agree with is an odd sort of 
token-token identity. A token of some activity in the brain is 
identical with a token of some activity of the mind. Types of 
tokens in the mind are defined in terms of behavior and similar 
                                                 
8
 J. J. C. Smart, ―The Identity Theory of Mind‖ (The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, 2008).  
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phenomenological characteristics, and those tokens in the brain 
have similarities as well, but the link of types of mental tokens to 
types of physical tokens are on account of the linkage of the tokens 
themselves. ―Pain is identical to c-fiber firing‖ does not mean that 
a being with no c-fibers cannot feel pain. Rather, individual tokens 
of pain in humans are found to link to tokens of c-fiber firing, but 
the link between pain and c-fiber firing in general is only on 
account of the commonality of the tokens of pain. In a being 
without c-fibers that still feels pain, such as a robot, we could say 
―pain is identical to a red wire firing,‖ or whatever the case is.  
Obviously this leaves the question of whether the pain in 
the robot is the same as the pain in us. I feel it is not, unless we‘ve 
made an effort to make a robot with the same physical and mental 
structure as us, but I still feel that it is reasonable to say it has pain, 
as long as it has connections to its physical body that induce 
unpleasant sensations in it and that serve a similar role as pain in 
us.; ―unpleasant‖ will be dependent on whatever reward 
mechanisms we design it to have. If a robot is has a mind, has a 
way of forming goals, some of which include the preservation of 
itself, has ways of gathering information about damage to its body, 
and has some sort of unavoidable phenomenological sensation that 
carries this information to its mind which encourages it to avoid 
that damage, then it has sensations that can be usefully called 
―pain.‖ It may not be pain like ours, but it is no less pain that ours 
is.  
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Kirk’s Basic Package9 
In order to deal with things like consciousness, or the mind, 
or the idea of an "internal perspective," you need fairly strong 
definitions, or at least reasonably clear guidelines of what will 
constitute such things. Instead of trying to form yet another new 
framework, I've decided to use Robert Kirk's ideas of the "basic 
package," and "deciders,‖ as well as his ―direct activity,‖ because 
the entire system seems to be the most reasonable and acceptable 
one I‘ve read yet. A decider is something that makes judgments 
about the world, analyzes it, and forms goals and what it sees as 
the most appropriate paths to those goals. This is in contrast with 
systems that act purely on reflex, and Kirk uses this contrast 
extensively to lay out what he means by a "decider." An example 
of a general reflex system would be a clam, which shuts its shell 
when exposed to certain sensations. It is important to remember 
the distinction I tried to make between consciousness and a 
"mind"—a conscious mind is a mind with this direct activity, but a 
system does not need to have a full rational mind to have direct 
activity. A clam still has sensation, and an internal perspective, 
despite not having the full, rich consciousness it would possess 
with the basic package. What Kirk focuses on is ―perception,‖ 
which refers to sensation in a system that can learn, and which is 
an integrated part of a conscious mind. Fully conscious systems are 
partially defined by perceiving their environment and learning 
                                                 
9
 Kirk uses the concept of the “basic package” extensively. It is developed 
through chapter 6, and put forward on p. 89-96, and throughout the rest. The  
concepts of various sorts of reflex systems, and deciders, are developed first, 
through p. 77-89. The discussion of sensation and consciousness is from p. 58-
61, as well as p. 92-94.  
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from their perceptions; similarly, perception is only perception in 
the sense that the system can do something consciously with the 
information, instead of having the sensation just cause a reflex.   
By Kirk's view, there is a succession of increasingly rich 
reflex systems. Initially, there is the ―pure reflex system,‖ such as a 
clam. These are systems with hardwired responses to stimuli, 
which are genetic (for biological systems) and cannot be altered by 
the system itself, nor are they designed to be altered by the external 
world. The ―road to the decider‖ is not simply a matter of 
increasing complexity—a complex organism like an oyster is just 
as much a pure reflex system as a protozoon, although biological 
organisms with greater complexity are generally partially that way 
to allow for more complex responses. There are then ―pure reflex 
systems with acquired stimuli,‖ where there is a slight amount of 
room for new responses to develop, and ―built in triggered reflex 
systems,‖ wherein certain stimuli open up subsections of the list of 
responses, which themselves otherwise stay inactive. Finally, just 
before we cross the threshold into the deciders, are ―triggered 
reflex systems with acquired conditions.‖ Kirk‘s example is the 
dragonfly, which learns to have a specific nest, but for whom that 
learning process is automatically set up to happen. That is, the 
dragonfly does not decide ―this is where I‘ll set my perch,‖ but 
rather certain conditions cause the variable ―perch‖ to get 
permanently filled in, which then gets plugged into the triggered 
reflex system.  
The threshold between this and the decider is the capacity 
of ―monitoring and controlling the responses,‖ and is the important 
part Kirk as emphasizes:  
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We have reached a highly significant watershed. 
For a system to monitor and modify its own 
behaviour involves a major break with the reflex 
pattern. Monitoring and modifying must involve 
not only the organism‘s being able to perceive 
its own behaviour, or at least the effects of its 
behaviour on its environment, but also to adjust 
its behaviour in ways appropriate to its goals. 
That requires it to be able to control its own 
behaviour on the basis of its information, in a 
way that none of the types of systems so far 
considered is capable of. [. . .] It seems probable 
that what we can conveniently refer to as 
‗monitoring‘, modifying‘, and ‗controlling‘ are 
highly complex processes, capable of being 
realized to a greater or lesser degree, at different 
levels of organization in the system as a whole, 
and in an indefinitely wide range of possible 
internal structural patterns.
10
 
 
He further says that what is important is the integration of all 
these processes. There is no requirement of how these processes 
must be executed, just that there are capabilities. To be a decider, 
to have the ―basic package,‖ is for something to be able to— 
(i)  Initiate and control its own behavior on the basis of 
incoming and retained information: information that it can 
use; 
(ii)  Acquire and retain information about its environment;  
(iii)  Interpret information;  
(iv)  Assess its situation;  
(v)  Choose between alternative courses of action on the basis 
                                                 
10
 Robert Kirk, Zombies and Consciousness (New York: Oxford, 2005), 87.  
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of retained and incoming information (equivalently, it can 
decide on a particular course of action); and 
(vi)  Have goals. 
Moreover, all of these must be unified and integrated.  
It‘s possible that a thing could have faculties similar to 
some of these, but to have these fully they must be all present and 
interrelated. Put another way, it makes no sense to talk of ―goals‖ 
without something being able to acquire and interpret information, 
or to choose between various actions, nor does it make sense to 
talk about controlling behavior unless a thing has goals, or 
interpreting or assessing information unless it‘s going to be put to a 
use, to a choice. A thing can ―sort of‖ interpret information, a 
thermometer for example, but it will not be doing so for itself. This 
again has a great deal to do with perception, which is just sensation 
that conveys information, that a decider can then act upon. Sheer 
sensation, experience, can be found in the simple reflex systems, 
without there being any understanding or perception, despite there 
often being some apparently intelligent reaction. This relates back 
to Kirk‘s definition of perception—sensation that conveys 
information, that a decider can then act upon. Sheer sensation, 
experience, can be found in the simple reflex systems, without 
there being any understanding or perception, despite there being 
reaction, often seemingly intelligent reaction.  
Bringing this back to the subject of artificial intelligence, 
what we deal with when we have seemingly intelligent systems is 
instead this very bare pure reflex system. Kirk will freely admit 
that he does not know enough of the subject of animal neurology to 
give clear examples of each sort of reflex system. Similarly, I will 
say that I am not sufficiently familiar with the programming of AI 
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to say what sort of system any one example is. However, by my 
earlier outline of an AI, what we currently have is often still a very 
simple sort of reflex system. Even the "learning systems" are likely 
only so-called "triggered reflex systems with acquired conditions," 
where certain approaches to learning are acquired, but are still 
within the reflexive framework set up beforehand by the 
programmer. It is entirely possible, though, that I am wrong here, 
and that what is causing me to hesitate is something else. 
 
Direct Activity
11
 
In Kirk‘s view, the basic package is not sufficient for 
phenomenal consciousness. What is also needed is ―direct 
activity,‖ or the direct action of sensation on the creature‘s 
decision-making process. We all experience direct activity, when 
any sort of sensation comes our way, because we cannot help but 
sense it. Initially it‘s difficult to even understand what Kirk means 
by direct activity, because it‘s unclear what the alternative would 
be. The simplest example of information gained indirectly is 
subliminal information—when we do sense something, and file it 
away somehow, but do not notice it and actually perceive it at the 
time. The information has been acquired, and can be used to alter 
our goals or our methods, but in order to do so we must indirectly 
access them after the fact. Kirk stresses instantaneity and priority 
in direct activity. The perceptual information is instantly available 
to an organism, and it also holds priority, immediately changing 
our goals and choices about the world.  
                                                 
11
 Another important concept, direct activity is detailed in Chapter 9 of Zombies, 
pp. 140-163.  
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He uses what he calls a ―rabbitoid‖ as an example,12 stating 
that a ―rabbitoid‖ is like a rabbit in all ways, except that sensory 
information does not act on it directly, but through some other 
method. It is difficult to imagine how this would work, but a 
possibility would be that the rabbitoid constantly queries its store 
of knowledge. When a fox comes up from behind a hill, the 
rabbitoid notices a second later during its regular ―scan‖ of its 
knowledge base, and then bounds away, relying on its stored 
model of the environment to navigate. A conscious rabbit has an 
advantage over a non-conscious rabbitoid in that it will 
automatically notice changes in its environment, and will be able 
to alter its immediate goals accordingly, while the rabbitoid would 
always have some sort of delay in action. The very best that a 
rabbitoid could do, would be to constantly re-scan its knowledge 
multiple times per second. This distinction still holds if you 
assume that rabbits do not possess full rational minds; the reflex 
system possessed by a rabbitoid would still function better if 
information about the environment directly affected its system 
instead of it needing to constantly retrieve stored information about 
the world. 
 
The Red Herring of Thought 
I want to interject a bit about conscious thought, and then 
about bats, before returning to consciousness. Thought is often 
considered a very important aspect of being human, and seems 
conflated with consciousness itself. But what happens when we 
think? One might say, we become aware of what‘s going on in our 
                                                 
12
 Ibid. pp. 142. 
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mind, that we ―look inside.‖ I think there‘s a problem with this, 
that our everyday sensation of thought and introspection is too 
naïve, and problematic. Imagine this extremely simplified and kind 
of silly picture of the mind, gained (of course) from introspection: 
there is a sort of ―black box,‖ in which all mental activity occurs. 
This box takes certain 
inputs, many of which are 
―conscious,‖ although 
some are not, and 
produces various outputs. 
These outputs include 
motion, activity, and 
speech, but (here is the 
point) also include 
―thought,‖ which is 
nothing more than aborted 
speech and self-produced 
sensation, re-routed back into the box. On only part of the ―edge of 
the box‖ is the ―membrane of consciousness.‖ In terms of this 
metaphor, things are conscious only as a result of passing through 
this membrane. Our knowledge of our mental activity is known 
only so far as we produce thoughts that are then reintroduced into 
consciousness. The activity within the black box is completely 
unknowable, and can only be inferred from the thoughts produced.  
This is a very flawed picture. Consciousness is not a 
membrane, there is not a line when things ―become conscious‖ in 
the brain. However, the salient point is that introspection is not 
directly accessing or monitoring our mental processes. Instead, 
thought is output that is reintroduced back into the system. This is 
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also flawed in that the reintroduction likely does not happen all at 
the same level—it would be better to imagine the circular arrows 
happening within the box, making loops of various sizes. But 
again, the point is that thought is activity re-routed, not the brain 
actively looking at itself.  
This seems like it would be efficient, more than growing 
some specialized "introspection" capability. If the brain has taken 
the time to create systems dedicated to processing, say, language, it 
makes sense that when we think in terms of language we simply 
route the output of our thoughts, as if we were speaking, back into 
the language processing bits, using the same hardware we‘d use if 
we were hearing, instead of developing a new system to ―monitor‖ 
our thoughts. Similarly, at earlier stages, our ability to remember 
and imagine things significantly overlaps with our capacity to 
sense things, and so it seems reasonable that instead of developing 
a new ―imagination‖ capacity, we rather develop the ability to 
stimulate those systems dedicated to dealing with perception. This 
also explains the sensation of thought, why it actually has a 
―sound,‖ instead of just being abstract activity. 
 
So, What is it Like to be a Bat?  
I assume a bat has sensation, and also consciousness. What 
I mean is, there is something it is ―like‖ to be a bat. Perhaps it 
doesn‘t have active thought, but it makes decisions, and its actions 
are complex and nuanced, reasoned. Nagel asked what it is like to 
be a bat; he, and others, concluded that we cannot know, that the 
life of a bat is fundamentally alien to us.  
But at least attempt to imagine what being a bat is like. The 
problem, initially, and as Nagel stresses, seems to be echolocation, 
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something we have no real analogue for. But this doesn‘t seem 
entirely impossible, merely very difficult. Try this:  
 
Close your eyes (perhaps read the instructions first, or, 
imagine closing your eyes). You can still hear, can you not? With 
your eyes closed, drop something like a book to your desk, and 
notice how you intuit its position from your impression of the 
sound. If you were to reach out, you could grasp it with some 
difficulty. If it were to make noise constantly, you could grasp it 
with near ease. A sharp sound to your left will give you an 
impression of “something” there. With your eyes closed, a man 
walking around a room, or a floor above with a thin ceiling, will 
give you an impression of motion, of presence. Focus on that 
impression of presence, separating it from the sensation of the 
sound itself.  
Now, with your eyes closed, feel out your surroundings. You 
can tell that this is a box, or that is a sphere. You can feel the 
dimensions of your desk, and you have an almost visual 
experience of this the size and shape of things. These sensations 
can be deceptive (how large are your teeth, when sensed with 
your tongue, and then when felt with your fingers?), but that is not 
surprising.  
Imagine the sensation you experience when a noise is heard, 
the sense of location and position. Isolate the feeling of position, 
the feeling of “a presence,” from the sensation of the noise itself, 
that it is a noise. Focus on the feeling of position and presence. 
Now, imagine the sensation of feeling the shape of an object, and 
isolate the impression of the form and size from the feeling of 
touch itself. Merge those feelings of position, as if you were 
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experiencing a thing’s form through a constant torrent of sound, 
where the sensation of any individual sound was drowned out by 
the ubiquity of the torrent, leaving only the feeling of position, 
form, size, and distance. What is there is not the sound, but the 
almost eerie sense of “something there,” the odd itching at your 
back, like the feeling of being watched without experiencing the 
watcher.  
Pretend you were blind, and had to live off of touch and 
sound to navigate, but then were able to somehow merge the 
impression of presence you get from sound, having the sounds 
themselves fade into the background, and then were to combine 
this with the feeling of form and shape gained through touch, 
having the feeling of touch itself be replaced with that background 
noise, extended to the range of your hearing. You would reach out 
constantly, as if touching through sound.  
Nagel would say that this is what it would be like for a 
human to be a bat (and even then, only barely), and would press 
the point, asking what is it like for a bat to be a bat. A human has 
its own beliefs, desires, goals, and so on, and to imagine what a 
bat's internal life is like is impossible since these will always 
interfere with our attempts. However, I feel that you can run into 
the same sorts of problems with asking a question as apparently 
simple as ―what is it like to be yourself?‖ 
First ask, what was it like to be yourself? Imagine yourself 
ten years ago, or even a day ago. How do you do this? Well, you 
extrapolate. I myself at this moment a day ago was bumbling 
about, taking a shower, not really interested in anything, assuming 
I‘d wake up a little in an hour or so and figure out what to do then. 
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Right now I‘m coming off of a long, caffeine-fueled writing 
session. Ten years ago I would be napping on an hour-long bus 
ride; if I was awake at this moment ten years ago, I‘d have been 
just woken up for some reason. Certainly, both of these involve 
being fairly groggy and sleepy, and to that extent I can imagine 
what it would have been like. However, the phenomenal quality of 
each experience is very different. The sleepiness I feel now is very 
different from ten years ago, and it is difficult to evoke that feeling 
in myself because to do so I would need to overwrite my current 
feeling. I cannot remember what it feels like, I can only 
extrapolate, evoke the feeling. 
But is this only because sleepiness is a muddled, vague 
feeling? Consider pains. When I was younger, I stubbed my toe. 
I‘ve done so many times over the years, in fact. And yet can I 
accurately remember what it felt like? No, only that there was an 
accompanying feeling of suffering. If anything, what I remember is 
the suffering, not the pain itself, and even that suffering is 
extrapolated. How I related to pain then is much different than how 
I relate to it now. What I feel when I imagine that pain is not what 
it was like for past me to feel pain, but what it would be like for 
present me to feel past me‘s pain, and only poorly. How different 
is this from trying to think what it‘s like to be a bat? Not 
impossibly so—and it is not a matter of kind, but of degree. It is 
much easier to imagine what it was like to be me feeling pain than 
what it‘s like to be a bat; but neither is perfect.  
What if I asked, what is it like to be you, a second ago? No 
no no, that‘s silly, surely. But pinch yourself. Ow. What was it 
like? Well… it hurt, yes, but can you evoke that sensation again? 
Not really. You can recall the suffering, and what the pain was sort 
 138 
 
of like, and how it still hurts a little now, but none of that is what it 
was like to be you a second ago, feeling that pain. So what is it like 
to be you, right now? Anytime you try to focus on that, you can 
only evoke the feelings a second later. What it is like to be you is 
constantly slipping away. You can only experience ―what it‘s like‖ 
to be anything, namely you, as it is experienced. To actually feel 
what it‘s like, you need to have the feeling at the moment. This 
also somewhat makes sense evolutionarily—why would we go 
through incredible effort and cost to repeat pleasurable actions if 
we could merely evoke the pleasure in our minds on command?  
That we cannot imagine what it is like to be a bat is not so 
surprising when we cannot even imagine what it is like to be 
ourselves. And yet this does not tell us that there was nothing that 
it was like to be ourselves, and it does not tell us that there is 
nothing that it is like to be a bat, and this says nothing about telling 
whether there is a ―what it‘s like‖ for any entity through physical 
observation.
13
 Our memories are not just ―not as vivid,‖ but 
entirely false, constructed. We cannot know the past ―what it‘s 
like,‖ or others‘ ―what it‘s like‖-s, just as we cannot know the 
―what it‘s like‖ for a bat—but we would not deny consciousness to 
our past selves, or to other people.  
 
What is it Like to be a Thermostat? 
To ascribe emotions, desires, or beliefs to a thermostat is 
silly. When I say that a thermostat has experience or sensation, I do 
not mean anything approaching our own experience. As Kirk 
                                                 
13
 A significant amount of this is paraphrased from Kirk (2005), ch. 5, especially 
p. 61-68. 
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would say, we are deciders, we interpret information and make 
decisions based on that information according to goals. A 
thermostat whose setting aligns with the ambient temperature does 
not ―feel content.‖ A thermostat set to a higher temperature does 
not ―desire to make things hotter.‖ A thermostat does not ―believe 
maintaining the temperature is good.‖ A thermostat does not 
perceive, because it does not interpret its sensations, does not work 
with information. Emotions, desires, and beliefs are fantastically 
complex and important aspects of our experience. Some day we 
will make a machine that does experience emotion and desire, and 
have beliefs, but it will be no time soon
14
. This is a reasonable and 
worthy goal, but it is important to realize how difficult it will be. 
So if we cannot say that a thermostat ―desires to make things 
hotter,‖ in what sense does it have an internal experience?  
When I ask ―what is it like to be a thermostat,‖ I‘m 
speaking of something that it is very, very difficult to imagine. It is 
hard enough to imagine what being a dog is like; harder still to 
imagine the life of a slug, and of a bacterium; so when we get 
down to something as bare and simple as a thermostat, we are truly 
a long ways away from our own experience. It is not even enough 
to try to sense things thoughtlessly, as the sensation of a thermostat 
is nothing like ours in any way. A thermostat is simpler even than 
an individual neuron.  
All I mean is that the thermostat ―senses.‖ It senses the 
temperature the same way a protozoon senses light levels and 
moves accordingly, or the same way a bacterium senses a certain 
                                                 
14
 No, I don’t have support for this, but I consider it the same sort of statement as 
“someday we will colonize other planets.” Barring something horrible 
happening, or the discovery of some extreme limiting factor, it seems so.  
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chemical in its environment and stops dividing
15—really it must be 
far more simple than that, but it is the same sort of ―basic reflex‖ 
as a clam closing its shell in response to certain stimuli, or a slug 
retracting a feeler when it touches something rough. In the same 
way that animals have moved from those basic reactions to our 
own, we should attempt a similar project to move from the 
thermostat (well maybe something else) to a conscious being like 
us. What this requires is a move from the ―reflex system with 
acquired conditions‖ to the actual ―decider.‖  
 
Conclusion: Does “Consciousness” Matter When Thinking of 
Artificial Intelligence?  
It depends on what the connotations of ―consciousness‖ are, 
which brings us back to Kirk‘s direct activity. If the difference is 
between having direct activity or not, between being a rabbit or a 
rabbitoid, it seems in fact that consciousness is of no importance, 
and the focus on ―what it‘s like‖ is missing the point. If, instead, 
―consciousness‖ is taken to deal with the difference between 
sensation and perception, between acting on reflex, or making 
judgments, having goals, and so on, then it is obviously of high 
value. A system that can actually analyze the world and make 
judgments will have an advantage over something that acts on 
predefined rules, assuming it is meant to deal with the sorts of 
                                                 
15
 Certain protozoa sense light, and then move their flagella to move toward it, 
but only when it is fairly mild; bright, constant light has no effect. Colonies of 
certain bacteria maintain a size by having each bacterium secrete a chemical, 
and then stop division when the chemical reaches a certain concentration, which 
lines up with a certain population.  
 141 
 
complex and variable situations that humans and other animals can 
handle.  
In other words, we should not be asking whether computers 
will be conscious; that is a matter of how they relate to 
information. What matters is how they process it, and the 
incidental aspects of consciousness (the instantaneity, the priority) 
should not be taken as essential to having a mind.  
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